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IMPEACHMENT OF ONE'S OWN WITNESS IN
SOUTH CAROLINA
The purpose of this note is to analyze the cases as to the impeach-
ment of one's own witness and, by interpreting the case of State v.
Nelson' and subsequent cases, to determine what effect they have
on the rule as it exists today.
Although at one time generally accepted in the United States, the
doctrine that a party calling a witness may not impeach him has
been the subject of much controversy since the earliest times; and
the modern tendency is to enlarge the possibility of self-impeachment.
One authority2 goes so far as to advocate the complete abolition of
the rule. It is commonly believed to have its roots in the ancient idea
of trial by compurgation.3 However, some authorities place its prob-
able origin in the transition from the inquisitorial method of trial as
it emerged into an adversary system.4
South Carolina Cases Prior to State v. Nelson5
Its conception in South Carolina was in 1828 in a case6 which
stated that the rule is confined to the introduction of general evidence
to destroy the credit of the witness; counsel may call other witnesses
to contradict him as to the particular facts relevant to the issue. The
rule excludes not only general evidence against the character, but
also former inconsistent declarations, and every matter that would be
inadmissible or irrelevant except for the purpose of impeaching the
credit. But, according to another case, 7 a party may introduce contra-
dictory evidence upon the facts material to the issue, and thus inci-
dentally impeach the credit of his own witness; and this will not let
in evidence of good character in reply.
A witness whom a party is compelled to call by law is not his,
in the sense that he cannot contradict or discredit him.8
A party may cross-examine his own witness if he is hostile or
shows that the facts as detailed by him are otherwise, but he can-
not contradict him by showing contrary or inconsistent statements,
or, by his testimony at a preliminary hearing.9 This rule was later
1. 192 S.C. 422, 7 S.E. 2d 72 (1940)
2. Ladd, Impeaching One's Own Witness, 4 U. Ci. L. Rav. 69, 96 (1936-7).
3. 3 WIGUORn, EVlDXNCE 896 (3d Ed. 1940).
4. 4 U. CI. L. IZv. 69 (1936-7).
5. 192 S.C. 422, 7 S.E. 2d 72 (1940).
6. Perry v. Massey, 1 Bail. 32 (S.C. 1828).
7. Farr v. Thompson, Cheves 37 (S.C. 1839).
8. Jerkowski v. Marco, 57 S.C. 402, 35 S.E. 750 (1900).
9. State v. McKay, 89 S.C. 234, 71 S.E. 858 (1911).
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interpreted as meaning that the court may, in its discretion, allow a
party to propound leading questions to his own witness for the
reason, among other things, that the witness is hostile to him.10
However, a party cannot directly contradict his own witness without
first laying the proper foundation, i. e., he was taken by surprise and
by request for cross-examination.1 1 This case, which requires the
laying of a foundation, and an earlier decision,' 2 which states that it
is not an abuse of discretion for a trial judge to permit the State to
interrogate a witness as to his evidence at a coroner's inquest, where
it is used to show that the State was taken by surprise by the wit-
ness, could possibly be "pointers" to the doctrine laid down in the
Nelson case.
State v. Nelson'3
The defendant was convicted of manslaughter. The defendant's
mother made statements which were highly prejudicial to the defen-
dant at a coroner's inquest. The State offered her as a witness and
she gave testimony which was altogether different, in essential and
material points, from the statements given at the inquest. The solici-
tor pointed this out and further stated that he had been taken by
surprise, and upon this ground asked for permission to cross-examine
the witness. Over objection by the defense, the solicitor was allowed
to cross-examine her as to that testimony and to read at length from
the questions and answers from the inquest and was allowed to ask
the witness if she did not make the statements read to her. The de-
fendant appealed claiming error in these admissions. It appears
that the appellant served the solicitor with a written notice stating
that the witness would not testify as she had at the inquest and also
what and how she would testify at the trial. The error assigned is
that, under the guise of surprise, the prejudicial testimony which was
inadmissible was allowed.
The first portion of the opinion gives a summary of the law previ-
ously stated in this article, With the remark that if justly limited and
rightfully applied, the rule is a wise and salutary one; but if not
properly limited and employed it may be unjust and mischievous.
For a more comprehensive view of that part of the opinion dealing
with the possible exception to the rule, the court's language is used:
10. Scott v. International Agr. Corp., 180 S. C. 1, 184 S.E. 133 (1936).
11. See note 10 supra. The foundation was never laid in this case and there-
fore respondent should not have been allowed to directly contradict his own wit-
ness.
12. State v. Waldrop, 73 S.C. 60, 52 S.E. 793 (1905).
13. 192 S.C. 422, 7 S.E. 2d 72 (1940).
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Hence, the general rule that a party cannot directly impeach or
discredit his own witness is subject to the exception that when
a witness proves hostile or recalcitrant, the party calling him may
probe his conscience or test his recollection to the end that the
whole truth may be laid bare; and the extent to which this may
be done depends upon judicial discretion exercised in the light
of the circumstances in which the question arises. The State,
however, contends that it not only had a right to cross-examine
the witness, but also to read to her before the jury her testimony
taken at the inquest, and to question her concerning her inconsis-
tent statements as shown by such testimony upon the ground of
surprise.
The cases generally hold that for a party to be able to impeach
his own witness on the ground of surprise or entrapment, it is
essential that it appear that the party has actually been surprised
by the testimony of such witness, or that he has been deceived
or entrapped into introducing the witness because of such con-
tradictory statements; and, as a corollary to this rule it follows
that a party who introduces a witness will not be permitted to
avail himself of a feigned surprise in order to get to the jury
contradictory statements of the witness previously given when
such statements are otherwise incompetent as evidence. 70 C.J.
Section 1227, page 1032. And in the same word (page 1035),
it is said that where the side calling the witness is on notice that
the witness will not testify in accordance with statements previ-
ously made by him, he cannot, of course, be impeached by the side
calling him, on the ground of surprise.
14
The court further said that evidence of contradictory statements is
theoretically evidence affecting credibility only, and is not substantive
evidence of the facts embraced in the contradictory statements. How-
ever, evidence of inconsistent statements does often influence the
jury, and because of this, a party should not be allowed to interrogate
his own witness in respect to previous inconsistent statements unless
he has actually suffered surprise or entrapment. The court found
that the State did not actually suffer surprise, and therefore reversed
the judgment and ordered a new trial.
Cases Subsequent to State v. Nelson
15
In a 1941 case 16 the Nelson decision was discussed and affirmed
14. Opinion by Justice Fisbburne.
15. 192 S.C. 422, 7 S.E. 2d 72 (1940).
16. White v. Sou. Oil Stores, 198 S.C. 173, 17 S.E. 2d 150 (1941).
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as to the general rule, but no mention was made of the surprise or
entrapment phase of the case. A case in 1946 states that it is always
permissible, however, for a party when taken by surprise to ask his
own witness whether he had made prior statements inconsistent with
his testimony. 17 Three cases' s which reaffirm the general rule or
portions of the general rule have been handed down since 1946, but
none of these dwell with the question of surprise or entrapment.
Conclusion
Thus, from a review of the cases, the general rule may be stated
as follows: A party is not concluded by the unfavorable testimony
of his own witness, but may prove any facts relevant to the issue
by any competent evidence even though it may be a direct contradic-
tion of the testimony of a former witness called by him. Further-
more, when a witness called by him proves hostile, the trial judge
may allow his examination to assume the character of cross-examina-
tion to the extent that leading questions may be asked of the witness.
The Nelson case stands as a liberalizing exception to this rule. If
the party calling the witness suffers actual surprise or entrapment,
the judge in the light of the circumstances, may allow the witness to
be examined so that the truth may be laid bare. Therefore, if the
party who called the witness had actual or possibly constructive notice
that the witness would not testify as he had previously, then he can-
not claim the exception under the guise of feigned surprise. Should
a party be surprised or entrapped, the former inconsistent statements
of the witness can be used for his impeachment only. They tend to
neutralize his testimony and go to the jury to impeach the credibility
of the hostile witness, but the jury cannot use such evidence as proof
of the matter stated, and they should be so charged.
The Nelson case, in 1940, seems to indicate a trend toward follow-
ing the modern view which liberalizes the self-impeachment rule. Al-
though it covers only one small phase, this alone will possibly be
South Carolina's liberalizing effect until the Legislature acts by statute
to modify the rule sufficiently to make it just, or abolishes it entirely.
ROBERT P. WILKINS.
17. State v. Russ, 208 S.C. 449, 38 S.E. 2d 385 (1946).
18. Ex Parte Nimmer, 212 S.C. 311, 47 S.E. 2d 716 (1948) ; State v. Hughey,
214 S.C. 111, 51 S.E. 2d 376 (1949) ; State v. Clough, 220 S.C. 390, 68 S.E.
2d 329 (1951).
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